This is the week we've all been waiting for. We've been watching one of the worst teams in baseball for 100 games, but now that time and perseverance will pay off as we get to answer the 99 cent question: will Frenchy or Melky go? It's like waiting to see the final episode of season 3 of your favorite cable TV cop-doctor-lawyer drama; will they kill-off Billy or Jimmy? Are Brad and Amber going to get married? It is the Royals, so it's much more like the season finale of Law and Order SVU than the Sopranos, but we're Royals junkies so we take what we can get.
There are just certian things you have to do as a syndicated Google Kansas City Royals beat blogger, and one of those is come-up with a trade deadline special. Guessing the correct outcomes could win you that Pulitzer you've been working so hard for, and it will also provide material to get you through the next few weeks of another lost baseball season. We've all been waiting for one more opportunity to ridicule Dayton Moore, so now's the time. If you want an honest analysis of what types of trades the Royals debating look here, but the PBR doesn't analyze prospects and trading just one player having a decent season gets you five minutes on Baseball Toninght, followed by six years of Sean O'Sullivan.
In keeping with the PBR's gun-slinger tactics we're prepared to graduate from Dayton Moore to Brian Cashman status. The Royals actually have more prospects and more salary room than the New York Yankees, so why not act the part. Dayton's tenure has provided nothing more than 90-100 loss seasons and one brief shining moment as having assembled the best minor league talent pool in baseball. If there isn't a sense of urgency in Moore, then there should be. Prospects are not always like fine wine, most times in fact they spoil and make you wish you had traded them when they were worth something. The Royals have the chance to pull off a memorable season next year. The All Star game is coming to town (this will not happen again for another 40 years), Eric Hosmer is ready to be KC's Super Star, the team is young and ready to win, they just need a few more horses. The answer is to trade for whatever makes you better now, the Future be damed. Trade 2014 for 2012, please Dayton, I can't watch for another year like this one. My answer: get Ubaldo Jimenez AND Wandy Rodriguez. Don't mess around with just one, get them both. I completely acknowledge that there is a huge risk involved here, but 2012 would suddenly look very interesting. They are the two best starters out there and they'll both be arond for a couple of years, so how do you do it?
Part One, Ubaldo: This is the player that you waste all of your time developing to hope one day makes it to the majors and signs a team friendly contract. The Rockies want a King's Ransom, well give it to them. Four of our top 10 prospects, fine!!! Are you overpaying? Absolutely. But that's what you do when you make the here-and-now important. Hosmer, Duffy and Moustakas are off limits, everyone else is in play. My package would be either Montgomery OR Wil Myers, Luke Hochever (they can hope, I'm done), two more from the bottom end of our top 10 prospects and throw in a Blake Wood for icing. Would that get you Ubaldo? It might. Could it cost more? Probably. The point is not what it costs, but what it might net you in return. This is the type of pitcher everyone dreams about having to start game one of a play-off series. And since we have entered the mindset of Brian Cashman, we know that you only develop prospects for the sole purpose of trading to get the Ubaldo Jimenez-types of the world. The Royals assets are two-fold; an abundance of young talent and no long-term money commitments. The difference between another trade deadline which involves the Royals selling on the likes of Bruce Chen, and one in which we find the Royals looking for that extra piece to solidfy their playoff run, will be how they use these two assets.
Part Two, Wandy: Wandy is older, more expensive and has much less upside than Ubaldo. In addition, the Houston Astros are in a much, much less enviable situation and should expect returns accordingly. Sorry Houston, a 30 year-old AL #3 starter doesn't get you Ubaldo equivalent returns. That said, he has been a pretty dependable guy and you can have a #5-ish prospect and a couple more top-30 guys. That's it! Obviously, if you get Ubaldo you don't need Wandy, but the strategy is to go all-in and leave nothing to chance. This way you go into next year with a rotation that goes from Hochevar-Chen-Davies-Francis-O'Sullivan to the slightly more respectabe Ubaldo-Wandy-Felipe-Duffy-Anyone starting five. Not bad right, maybe #5 is Hochevar, maybe Mongomery, maybe Aaron Crow, but the much more important question is answered; YOU KNOW WHO YOUR #1 IS!!! This is the question which the Royals absolutely must answer if next season is going to look different than this one (and 25 others). Who cares who your #3-#5 pithcers are, in order to be a winner you have to know who your top-end is. And the Royals just don't know that right now. Sure you can dream on the likes of Duffy, Montgomery, Paulino, but with guys like Ubaldo and Wandy your dreams are less fantasy and more reality.
Emptying most of the top end of your farm system could be a huge mistake, but I think the reward is worth the risk in the case of the Royals. Pulling off one of these moves would be the talk of baseball and send a message to take note of the 2012 Royals throughout MLB. Trading for both would be insane, but my patience has run thin. I'm impressed with Hosmer, Duffy, not so much Moustakas - but I'm still optimistic. However, 2012 still holds too many contingencies for my liking and finding a true ACE via the trade market should be Dayton's biggest task. Flip a coin and throw darts over Frenchy and Melky and do the same for Francis and Chen. Kudos Dayton, you have done a fantasic job with getting milage out of seemingly washed up veterans, but all of the Frenchys, Melkys, Chens and Betemits will not, and have not, taken us even one step closer to becoming winners. Intelligent small market baseball dicates that you develop from within and follow the Tampa Bay blueprint, but at some point you have to cash in those chips and take a big step forward. That time is now.
Monday, July 25, 2011
Friday, July 15, 2011
How to Play Bubba Starling
At this point the Royals brass and general followers of the Royals have holed up and tried to figure out how to squeeze some value out of the current roster in the trade market as the deadline approaches. There is always "action available at the betting windows" (this is why you become a GM in the first place) and Dayton is going to come up with something which we can all write about after it occurs. In reality, the return is likely to be mediocre at best. The Royals' best trade equation is still addition by subtraction.
This being said, we believe the Royals should try and break the current practice of letting your first round draft pick sit around and eat Cheez-Its all summer while listening to Scott Boras approved self-esteem books on tape. The Powder Blue Room has come up with a new unique strategy to accomplish two things. One; get Bubba Starling in a minor league uniform and playing baseball. Two; set a precedent for how to deal with high first round picks.
The understood forfeiture of a player's first year in the minors appears to be an underrated hindrance in most organizations. The real reasons are due to gamesmanship or so Scott Boras can appear to earn his fee and all are a major setback in the development of a high school player, especially the toolsy, "athlete" type player. By now the drill is pretty straight forward. The two sides don't even bother talking until late July, where everyone threatens to go to college, go play for the Fort Worth Power Lug Nut Donkey Shoes and re-enter the draft next year, this that and the other before miraculously coming to an agreement right before the signing deadline in middle August.
As Rany on the Royals pointed out, Bubba is your new age "old" guy masquerading as a high school senior. In order for a prospect like Bubba to have a shot at "developing" all the proposed talent he posses, he can't be darn near 20 years old before he plays his first minor league game. The first season is important and it would be important in any sense, but the age of Starling makes it that much more important. So important that we believe the Royals have a legitimate argument to say "Bubba, your value goes considerably down if you don't get a full season in this year".
As a high school draftee, it is unlikely the Royals will have to cough up a major league contract to Bubba. Scott Boras can hand out all the prepared charts and marketing three ring binders he wants. He can give a two hundred slide power point presentation of Bubba Starling highlights with Eye of the Tiger playing as background music, but the bottom line is that it is going to take about $7 or $7.5 million to sign Bubba and get this experiment off the ground.
As the Royals' "Wartime Consigliere" here is how the Powder Blue Room suggests the Royals play it. Back on June 7th, the first day after the draft, you walk in and say "Bubba, here is a contract for $7.5 million. It is on the high side, but you sign that thing with-in two weeks, get in a uniform and it is yours".
Then you tell Bubba the following: "Bubba, the rub here buddy is we don't think you are worth as much if you take this year off. So for every two-weeks you don't sign we take $500,000 off the contract amount. So if you want to go to Nebraska and try and be Tommy Frazier, go ahead, but we value the actual act of playing baseball and you are no spring chicken, so let's get to it".
Scott Boras is a smart guy and gets his fee based on the total amount of the contract. He gives up getting to play super negotiator guy, but all in all he ends up with the same amount of money in his pocket. The Royals potentially overpay a little, but they get a full minor league season out of Bubba and a much better probability he realizes his potential.
You put this in writing and send it to every media outlet and you hold a press conference stating the terms of the deal. Then you stick to it on the following premise: "You are not worth as much if you take the summer off, in our opinion. We offered you big time money, and the only thing you didn't get to do is go through the negotiation dance. Royals fans, don't be discouraged because if he sits the summer out, he was only worth what the reduced contract offer would be. We are not being cheap, in fact we offered to overpay, but in order for these players to realize their potential they have to get started. Surely you understand.".
In the end maybe Team Bubba gets all offended and heads off to Lincoln to get flattened by some freak of nature in costume as a defensive end at Ohio State in the fall. Then in the spring it turns out Bubba isn't that good at baseball anyway and life goes on.
But you have to stick to it. You put the money in escrow and make the terms public so everyone knows that it is about the service, not the money. Spin this thing correctly and the Royals win. Dayton, your Wartime Consigliere doesn't hand out on the record advise very often, but this one could turn you into something big time.
This practice might become all the rage and become known as "The Moore Play". Michael Lewis might write a book about you. Highly paid corporate speaking gigs on negotiating are sure to follow along with offers to broker Middle East peace accords. Perhaps you could start your own compensation consultancy. Do it Dayton, our fee is on the house.
This being said, we believe the Royals should try and break the current practice of letting your first round draft pick sit around and eat Cheez-Its all summer while listening to Scott Boras approved self-esteem books on tape. The Powder Blue Room has come up with a new unique strategy to accomplish two things. One; get Bubba Starling in a minor league uniform and playing baseball. Two; set a precedent for how to deal with high first round picks.
The understood forfeiture of a player's first year in the minors appears to be an underrated hindrance in most organizations. The real reasons are due to gamesmanship or so Scott Boras can appear to earn his fee and all are a major setback in the development of a high school player, especially the toolsy, "athlete" type player. By now the drill is pretty straight forward. The two sides don't even bother talking until late July, where everyone threatens to go to college, go play for the Fort Worth Power Lug Nut Donkey Shoes and re-enter the draft next year, this that and the other before miraculously coming to an agreement right before the signing deadline in middle August.
As Rany on the Royals pointed out, Bubba is your new age "old" guy masquerading as a high school senior. In order for a prospect like Bubba to have a shot at "developing" all the proposed talent he posses, he can't be darn near 20 years old before he plays his first minor league game. The first season is important and it would be important in any sense, but the age of Starling makes it that much more important. So important that we believe the Royals have a legitimate argument to say "Bubba, your value goes considerably down if you don't get a full season in this year".
As a high school draftee, it is unlikely the Royals will have to cough up a major league contract to Bubba. Scott Boras can hand out all the prepared charts and marketing three ring binders he wants. He can give a two hundred slide power point presentation of Bubba Starling highlights with Eye of the Tiger playing as background music, but the bottom line is that it is going to take about $7 or $7.5 million to sign Bubba and get this experiment off the ground.
As the Royals' "Wartime Consigliere" here is how the Powder Blue Room suggests the Royals play it. Back on June 7th, the first day after the draft, you walk in and say "Bubba, here is a contract for $7.5 million. It is on the high side, but you sign that thing with-in two weeks, get in a uniform and it is yours".
Then you tell Bubba the following: "Bubba, the rub here buddy is we don't think you are worth as much if you take this year off. So for every two-weeks you don't sign we take $500,000 off the contract amount. So if you want to go to Nebraska and try and be Tommy Frazier, go ahead, but we value the actual act of playing baseball and you are no spring chicken, so let's get to it".
Scott Boras is a smart guy and gets his fee based on the total amount of the contract. He gives up getting to play super negotiator guy, but all in all he ends up with the same amount of money in his pocket. The Royals potentially overpay a little, but they get a full minor league season out of Bubba and a much better probability he realizes his potential.
You put this in writing and send it to every media outlet and you hold a press conference stating the terms of the deal. Then you stick to it on the following premise: "You are not worth as much if you take the summer off, in our opinion. We offered you big time money, and the only thing you didn't get to do is go through the negotiation dance. Royals fans, don't be discouraged because if he sits the summer out, he was only worth what the reduced contract offer would be. We are not being cheap, in fact we offered to overpay, but in order for these players to realize their potential they have to get started. Surely you understand.".
In the end maybe Team Bubba gets all offended and heads off to Lincoln to get flattened by some freak of nature in costume as a defensive end at Ohio State in the fall. Then in the spring it turns out Bubba isn't that good at baseball anyway and life goes on.
But you have to stick to it. You put the money in escrow and make the terms public so everyone knows that it is about the service, not the money. Spin this thing correctly and the Royals win. Dayton, your Wartime Consigliere doesn't hand out on the record advise very often, but this one could turn you into something big time.
This practice might become all the rage and become known as "The Moore Play". Michael Lewis might write a book about you. Highly paid corporate speaking gigs on negotiating are sure to follow along with offers to broker Middle East peace accords. Perhaps you could start your own compensation consultancy. Do it Dayton, our fee is on the house.
Thursday, July 14, 2011
Baseball is back!
Finally! Here we go with the second half of the season, nothing has changed but there are still a lot of games to play and who really knows what to expect. The PBR feels all of this "analysis" is getting a little stale and in the words of Ned Yost we're going to try and "freshen things up a bit." Here we go with some random thoughts from the first game after the all-star break.
Bruce Chen could get away with murder, the first two innings: 5 baserunners, one thrown out at the plate and no runs.
The Royals start out by capitalizing on errors and scoring a couple of greasy runs, do I sense a repeat of the hot start in April???
Hosmer is going with the goatee style facial hair and giving up on the full beard, I'm not sure if I like the change but I guess a full beard in KC in August is suicide - let's see how it goes.
Routine ground ball to Chris Getz turns into a hit, defensive specialist you say Mr. Yost?? Sorry, I just can't get off the Mike Aviles bandwagon.
Moustakas says thanks for the double Delmon. Brayan Pena is my favorite player, hands down. Another slightly unearned run. 3-0, that's all Chen needs.
Chen just blew away someone with an 84mph fastball, I don't get it. Two more runners LOB, Chen is making it look easy, Yost was right; if he hadn't gone on the DL we'd be fighting for first place.
Classic Getz! Groundball to SS, bobble and he beats it out for a hit. Ned will applaud the speed and athleticism while ignoring the .291 SLG%.
The "AT&T trivia" has finally stumped Ryan and Frank. Normally it is more or less a chance for them to show off their baseball knowledge and defeat the purpose of fan trivia by shouting out every possible answer until they're forced to post the results. Oh wait, Frank just informed us that he knew the answer all along, but held it in so we could guess, thanks Frank.
Plouffe! Just like that it's 4-3 and Chen couldn't quite escape another inning. I was just working on the terms of a new 3-year $20 million contract to offer Chen - guess I'll keep that in the bank.
Frank and Ryan are debating the merits and tactics behind advancing runners from second to third with no outs for the 107th time this year. Surprisingly, Frenchy did not get the job done.
Royals default staff ace goes 5IP 4ER, good things are in store for the rotation.
Please Frank and Ryan, I'm begging you, no more Frenchy clubhouse leader talk! I can't hear it anymore. You can't talk about leaders on teams with the 3rd worst record in baseball; they are failing at leading or they're not leaders. You can't have it both ways. "The leader of the Greek economy really has his Economics Ministry feeling good about themselves."
Ned's really working those bullpen match-ups in a 8-3 game. Gotta play the percentages, and burn out your pen in the first game after the all-star break.
I'm really starting to worry about Butler, he seems disinterested in hitting baseballs. Frenchy is the leader, Gordon is now a better hitter and Hosmer isn't moving from first base, what's his role??? Turn that frown upside-down Billy!
Bullpen not impressive, offense goes to sleep, Royals lose. That game was pretty much the opposite of what would make me excited to tune in for the second half. More of the same, another day in the life of a Royals fan.
Bruce Chen could get away with murder, the first two innings: 5 baserunners, one thrown out at the plate and no runs.
The Royals start out by capitalizing on errors and scoring a couple of greasy runs, do I sense a repeat of the hot start in April???
Hosmer is going with the goatee style facial hair and giving up on the full beard, I'm not sure if I like the change but I guess a full beard in KC in August is suicide - let's see how it goes.
Routine ground ball to Chris Getz turns into a hit, defensive specialist you say Mr. Yost?? Sorry, I just can't get off the Mike Aviles bandwagon.
Moustakas says thanks for the double Delmon. Brayan Pena is my favorite player, hands down. Another slightly unearned run. 3-0, that's all Chen needs.
Chen just blew away someone with an 84mph fastball, I don't get it. Two more runners LOB, Chen is making it look easy, Yost was right; if he hadn't gone on the DL we'd be fighting for first place.
Classic Getz! Groundball to SS, bobble and he beats it out for a hit. Ned will applaud the speed and athleticism while ignoring the .291 SLG%.
The "AT&T trivia" has finally stumped Ryan and Frank. Normally it is more or less a chance for them to show off their baseball knowledge and defeat the purpose of fan trivia by shouting out every possible answer until they're forced to post the results. Oh wait, Frank just informed us that he knew the answer all along, but held it in so we could guess, thanks Frank.
Plouffe! Just like that it's 4-3 and Chen couldn't quite escape another inning. I was just working on the terms of a new 3-year $20 million contract to offer Chen - guess I'll keep that in the bank.
Frank and Ryan are debating the merits and tactics behind advancing runners from second to third with no outs for the 107th time this year. Surprisingly, Frenchy did not get the job done.
Royals default staff ace goes 5IP 4ER, good things are in store for the rotation.
Please Frank and Ryan, I'm begging you, no more Frenchy clubhouse leader talk! I can't hear it anymore. You can't talk about leaders on teams with the 3rd worst record in baseball; they are failing at leading or they're not leaders. You can't have it both ways. "The leader of the Greek economy really has his Economics Ministry feeling good about themselves."
Ned's really working those bullpen match-ups in a 8-3 game. Gotta play the percentages, and burn out your pen in the first game after the all-star break.
I'm really starting to worry about Butler, he seems disinterested in hitting baseballs. Frenchy is the leader, Gordon is now a better hitter and Hosmer isn't moving from first base, what's his role??? Turn that frown upside-down Billy!
Bullpen not impressive, offense goes to sleep, Royals lose. That game was pretty much the opposite of what would make me excited to tune in for the second half. More of the same, another day in the life of a Royals fan.
Saturday, July 9, 2011
Yostian Leadoff Logic
It's easy to pick-on managers of losing teams and single out certain idiosyncrasies as making a much bigger impact on the team's performance than they actually do. This is admittedly what I'm trying to do here, but Ned's insistence on batting Chris Getz in the leadoff spot has made the team worse and, by Yost's own admission, doesn't make sense. Let's take a look at how Ned justifies his constantly evolving and shifting logic on who the team's leadoff hitter should be:
“When I looked at it, I thought, ‘OK, as good of a hitter as Mike is, I don’t really have any leadoff candidates outside of (Chris) Getz — because Getzie has some speed and can steal some bases.’ But Mike has more offensive capabilities.”
This was coming out of spring training and as it turns out might have been the second most intelligent thing Yost goes on to say all year regarding leadoff hitters. It was these types of comments that gave me hope in Yost's ability to be a good manager and not put people like Getz in the leadoff spot just because of the age old baseball wisdom that leadoff hitters have to be slap-hitting speedsters. Ned would obviously abandon this logic, even though it still stands true to this day that Mike Aviles IS a better hitter than Chris Getz.
“I’d rather have him further down the lineup,” Yost admitted, “but I want to have guys who get on base at the top of the lineup…
“It doesn’t make any sense having a .290 or .300 on-base guy leadoff.”
Pure Genius! Ned moving Alex Gordon to the leadoff spot was by far and away the most intelligent managerial decision he's made as a KC Royal. He wanted a guy who got on base to hit first, he wanted one of the better hitters on the team to hit the most often. It was smart. It was going well. And then....
"There’s no magic cure, no magic elixir, that’s going to fix everything,” Yost said. “But this changes it around and gives it a bit of a different look. We’ll just see if we can freshen it up a little bit. It’s been stale lately.”
This is where Ned takes a turn for the worse. The stale line-up shuffle logic??? It's time-honored managerial strategy 101. The problem is there wasn't a problem. If it ain't broke, just break it. The Gordon leadoff move was going along swimmingly, it just happened to coincide with a Hosmer slump, an even bigger Jeff Francouer slump, sending Mike Aviles down thus ending the effective Getz-Aviles platoon and taking one of the team's best hitters out of the line-up (Wilson Betemit). But no, Yost wouldn't see that, instead he would just ramble off something about how to "freshen up" a line up and thus give-up on his previous logic which led him to his best decision in hitting Godon leadoff.
“Melky is as clutch of a hitter as we’ve got,” Yost said. “That’s what you look at late in the game when the top of the order comes up. You’re trying to get your best hitters to the top of your order and let them produce.”
This was the (brief) result of the Gordon switch which again contained some well founded logic and wasn't bad because it moved-up Hosmer to #2 and placed Gordon and Butler in the middle instead of the streaky Frenchy. Though you can sense his logic starting to falter here as he talks about "clutch hitting" from the leadoff spot and implies that it must have been Gordon's lack of clutch hitting which led to the "stale" line-up. This line-up lasted five games, the Royals went 2-3 and nothing bad really happend. Then the Royals head to San Diego and the National League rules, Getz is riding a modest hot-streak, and Ned Yost loses his mind. His answer to not having Billy Butler in the line-up is to move Chris Getz to the #2 spot??? The Royals lose all three games and Yost decides to move Getz to the leadoff spot on July 1, 2011...
“He’s hot right now,” manager Ned Yost said.
Forget everything I said before, Getzie is HOT, HOT, HOT. He's the leadoff solution. What I said about having your best hitters and on-base guys, scratch that here is my new theory...
"You spread 'em out more," Yost said. "I want speed and athleticism at the top and I want guys that can at least have a chance to produce down at the bottom and keep it going."
What does this mean? Producers at the bottom and athletes at the top? Chris Getz can't produce, so you might as well lead him off and make sure he hits more often because he is fast? Nope, it turns out that Chris Getz IS a producer and Ned wants that all important BA with runners in scoring position at the top...
“You look every year, and the leaders in RBIs are basically the same. The leaders in home runs will basically be the same. Batting average, the same thing. Year in, year out. But runners in scoring position changes every stinkin’ year.”
This is said in reference to Getzie's uncanny ability to hit with runners in scoring position. You can tell Ned is confused here, he has gone past the point of no return and is just saying things for the sake of it. Here is an interesting stat which might, just maybe, be slightly more applicable to your leadoff hitter. Chris Getz when hittting first:
Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 7/9/2011.
Things like this are surely symptomatic of a losing team and in no way would a change lead to a winning team, but Ned went from logical, to genius, and finally has reverted back to the rantings of an illogical, stubborn, typical baseball manager. This is not what we need from Ned. It's obviously not helping the team to have YOUR WORST hitter batting leadoff just because he runs fast. I don't know what's next for the Royals at the leadoff spot but anything is better than Chris Getz.
Ned on Mike Aviles:
“When I looked at it, I thought, ‘OK, as good of a hitter as Mike is, I don’t really have any leadoff candidates outside of (Chris) Getz — because Getzie has some speed and can steal some bases.’ But Mike has more offensive capabilities.”
This was coming out of spring training and as it turns out might have been the second most intelligent thing Yost goes on to say all year regarding leadoff hitters. It was these types of comments that gave me hope in Yost's ability to be a good manager and not put people like Getz in the leadoff spot just because of the age old baseball wisdom that leadoff hitters have to be slap-hitting speedsters. Ned would obviously abandon this logic, even though it still stands true to this day that Mike Aviles IS a better hitter than Chris Getz.
Ned on Gordon:
“I’d rather have him further down the lineup,” Yost admitted, “but I want to have guys who get on base at the top of the lineup…
“It doesn’t make any sense having a .290 or .300 on-base guy leadoff.”
Pure Genius! Ned moving Alex Gordon to the leadoff spot was by far and away the most intelligent managerial decision he's made as a KC Royal. He wanted a guy who got on base to hit first, he wanted one of the better hitters on the team to hit the most often. It was smart. It was going well. And then....
Ned on taking Gordon out of the leadoff spot:
"There’s no magic cure, no magic elixir, that’s going to fix everything,” Yost said. “But this changes it around and gives it a bit of a different look. We’ll just see if we can freshen it up a little bit. It’s been stale lately.”
This is where Ned takes a turn for the worse. The stale line-up shuffle logic??? It's time-honored managerial strategy 101. The problem is there wasn't a problem. If it ain't broke, just break it. The Gordon leadoff move was going along swimmingly, it just happened to coincide with a Hosmer slump, an even bigger Jeff Francouer slump, sending Mike Aviles down thus ending the effective Getz-Aviles platoon and taking one of the team's best hitters out of the line-up (Wilson Betemit). But no, Yost wouldn't see that, instead he would just ramble off something about how to "freshen up" a line up and thus give-up on his previous logic which led him to his best decision in hitting Godon leadoff.
Ned on Melky:
“Melky is as clutch of a hitter as we’ve got,” Yost said. “That’s what you look at late in the game when the top of the order comes up. You’re trying to get your best hitters to the top of your order and let them produce.”
This was the (brief) result of the Gordon switch which again contained some well founded logic and wasn't bad because it moved-up Hosmer to #2 and placed Gordon and Butler in the middle instead of the streaky Frenchy. Though you can sense his logic starting to falter here as he talks about "clutch hitting" from the leadoff spot and implies that it must have been Gordon's lack of clutch hitting which led to the "stale" line-up. This line-up lasted five games, the Royals went 2-3 and nothing bad really happend. Then the Royals head to San Diego and the National League rules, Getz is riding a modest hot-streak, and Ned Yost loses his mind. His answer to not having Billy Butler in the line-up is to move Chris Getz to the #2 spot??? The Royals lose all three games and Yost decides to move Getz to the leadoff spot on July 1, 2011...
Ned on Getzie:
“He’s hot right now,” manager Ned Yost said.
Forget everything I said before, Getzie is HOT, HOT, HOT. He's the leadoff solution. What I said about having your best hitters and on-base guys, scratch that here is my new theory...
"You spread 'em out more," Yost said. "I want speed and athleticism at the top and I want guys that can at least have a chance to produce down at the bottom and keep it going."
What does this mean? Producers at the bottom and athletes at the top? Chris Getz can't produce, so you might as well lead him off and make sure he hits more often because he is fast? Nope, it turns out that Chris Getz IS a producer and Ned wants that all important BA with runners in scoring position at the top...
“You look every year, and the leaders in RBIs are basically the same. The leaders in home runs will basically be the same. Batting average, the same thing. Year in, year out. But runners in scoring position changes every stinkin’ year.”
This is said in reference to Getzie's uncanny ability to hit with runners in scoring position. You can tell Ned is confused here, he has gone past the point of no return and is just saying things for the sake of it. Here is an interesting stat which might, just maybe, be slightly more applicable to your leadoff hitter. Chris Getz when hittting first:
Split G GS PA AB BA OBP SLG OPS Batting 1st 26 26 119 101 .168 .252 .208 .460
Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 7/9/2011.
Things like this are surely symptomatic of a losing team and in no way would a change lead to a winning team, but Ned went from logical, to genius, and finally has reverted back to the rantings of an illogical, stubborn, typical baseball manager. This is not what we need from Ned. It's obviously not helping the team to have YOUR WORST hitter batting leadoff just because he runs fast. I don't know what's next for the Royals at the leadoff spot but anything is better than Chris Getz.
Thursday, June 30, 2011
Halfway to Nowhere
81 down, 81 to go. Here we are coming off what was maybe the worst series of the year looking toward a second half filled with little to be excited about. Let's just see what's going on in Yosty's mind as he readies himself to start the second half and get this ship back on track:
Inside the bathroom of Suite #27 at the Downtown Denver Four Seasons
I'm really ready to kick off this 6-man rotation. I came up with it all on my own. It will work. I have six below average starters, so the way to make it work is to pitch them less often, Ned it's F-ing Managerial Gold. I really didn't want to send my little Duffy down to the minors again, I've really got him on the right track. It was probably all of that Ned Yost Tuff Love ©. It worked on Escobar, it worked on Gordon, it worked on Soria, hasn't worked on Hoch yet, but it will. I'm really having a hard time coming-up with a pet name for Danny Duffy, both first and last name end in a 'y' and I usually just add that to the end of a players name. Do I take off the 'y' and just call him Duff, that's just not Ned Yost enough. I'll keep working on it, there has got to be another way.
"I'll have a Denver Omelet."
Batting orders are so hard. Good thing Butler's not playing today, this gives me another opportunity to bat Chris Getz #2. Getzy has been on fire, got that BA all the way up to .270 and he can hit-and-run so well, just the perfect #2 hitter. If I could have kids again, they would be just like Chris Getz. I wish I had nine guys just like Getzy playing everyday. Well, maybe 5 Chris Getz clones and 4 Jeff Francouer clones. That team would win. I've got a hunch today: we're going to bat Melky #4, Alex is #3 and Alcides will leadoff. I've just got this hunch and my momma always told me to play your hunches. Man, a Denver omelet really does taste better in Devner. I wonder if French fries taste better in France. I need a shower.
Tomorrow's another day, Tomorrow IS another day, Tomorrow IS ANOTHER day. I don't trust that shaving gel, I stick with the foam. Old Spice aftershave smells good. I'm going to get through to that punk kid Hosmer today. What does he think he's doing swinging at all of those pitches. I keep telling him this isn't the minors Eric, just watch how Chris Getz hits, take your time. Hosmer doesn't listen. I can't believe Butler's still mad at me for that astronaut comment. He can't play first base, Ned's decision is final. If I was Dayton Moore I'd trade Billy and Eric both, they're just a couple of babies who would never have made it in my day. All we have to do is win 15 in a row and we're back in this thing, I don't know what everybody is so worried about.
Inside the bathroom of Suite #27 at the Downtown Denver Four Seasons
I'm really ready to kick off this 6-man rotation. I came up with it all on my own. It will work. I have six below average starters, so the way to make it work is to pitch them less often, Ned it's F-ing Managerial Gold. I really didn't want to send my little Duffy down to the minors again, I've really got him on the right track. It was probably all of that Ned Yost Tuff Love ©. It worked on Escobar, it worked on Gordon, it worked on Soria, hasn't worked on Hoch yet, but it will. I'm really having a hard time coming-up with a pet name for Danny Duffy, both first and last name end in a 'y' and I usually just add that to the end of a players name. Do I take off the 'y' and just call him Duff, that's just not Ned Yost enough. I'll keep working on it, there has got to be another way.
Ned get's Hungry and heads to the lobby for breakfast
"I'll have a Denver Omelet."
Batting orders are so hard. Good thing Butler's not playing today, this gives me another opportunity to bat Chris Getz #2. Getzy has been on fire, got that BA all the way up to .270 and he can hit-and-run so well, just the perfect #2 hitter. If I could have kids again, they would be just like Chris Getz. I wish I had nine guys just like Getzy playing everyday. Well, maybe 5 Chris Getz clones and 4 Jeff Francouer clones. That team would win. I've got a hunch today: we're going to bat Melky #4, Alex is #3 and Alcides will leadoff. I've just got this hunch and my momma always told me to play your hunches. Man, a Denver omelet really does taste better in Devner. I wonder if French fries taste better in France. I need a shower.
Ned heads back upstairs for a quick shower and shave before BP
Tomorrow's another day, Tomorrow IS another day, Tomorrow IS ANOTHER day. I don't trust that shaving gel, I stick with the foam. Old Spice aftershave smells good. I'm going to get through to that punk kid Hosmer today. What does he think he's doing swinging at all of those pitches. I keep telling him this isn't the minors Eric, just watch how Chris Getz hits, take your time. Hosmer doesn't listen. I can't believe Butler's still mad at me for that astronaut comment. He can't play first base, Ned's decision is final. If I was Dayton Moore I'd trade Billy and Eric both, they're just a couple of babies who would never have made it in my day. All we have to do is win 15 in a row and we're back in this thing, I don't know what everybody is so worried about.
Sunday, June 26, 2011
Bare With Me
So the Royals close out a fairly lackluster homestand in which the Arizona Diamondbacks demonstrated for us what good young teams look like and then the Cubs came to town to boost dismal attendance numbers at the K and play to see who is the worst non-Houston Astros Team (KC Wins!). This is not interesting baseball. What makes this season even worse is that it is clearly a year in which the Royals would have had a shot to steal the division had they simply been able to stay around .500. But now they're batting, once again, to stay out of last place. As the trade deadline nears, the Royals will certainly be discussed as sellers and not as buyers, they may be able to sucker someone into Melky Cabrera or Jeff Francis for a prospect or two, but these will all boil down to Shaun O'Sullivan, Vin Mazarro and at best Tim Collins returns. Trading Melky Cabrera-types won't get you to that next level. I believe that it is time for Dayton Moore to be bold and start taking calculated risks that get the 2012 Royals looking like potential contenders. This year the Royals are in a great position as sellers with minor league talent to spare and no big Jose Guillen contracts hanging around so they're not looking to just dump payroll because they have NO payroll. Thanks to Gil Meche's generosity and the trades of Greinke and DeJesus, the team is sporting a payroll of under $36 mil. The lowest in baseball. Now comes the hard part, what do you do with a 2011 budget surplus of $30+ mil???
I said that you were going to have to bare with me on this one. This proposed trade has two parts: the theory and the actuality. First lets start with the theory; Carlos has an inflated contract, the Cubs desperately want rid of him, the Royals have payroll space, there is not one single middling starting pitcher worth paying for in the 2012 free agent class and by the way the Royals need a starter. Who is your projected 2012 KC Royals starting rotating? It's scary, I know. So it could be anyone, but Big Z is just the best case that I've been able to come-up with. One of the big advantages in contract absorption trades is that you won't have to give up much, so the Royals can hold on to all of their precious prospects and let go of maybe two mid-tier guys. Here is how the economics of the trade break down; Carlos is still owed something like $9 mil this year and $18 mil for 2012. Yes, these are big numbers, but the Cubs know they need to eat a good chunk of that if they want to rid themselves of Carlos and get anything in return. So I believe the best way to use the Royals deflated 2011 payroll is to eat a few mil from another team's bad contract this year, while still gaining a much needed asset. If the Royals agree to take on something like half of the contract, that means somewhere in the neighborhood of four million this year and nine next year. I'm just assuming these numbers, but if the Cubs wanted a team to pay much more than that, it would be silly. The point is; who does it hurt if the Royals payroll creeps over $40 mil this year? It's like a tree falling in the woods; the Royals planned to have around a $70 million payroll this year so it seems to me that tacking on a few mil this year will not hurt anyone. If no money is added, David Glass will simply become imperceptibly richer and maybe Christmas bonuses are little better in the executive suite. But that's it, the books will rollover to 2012, and Luke Hochevar will again be our opening day starter. I call this the theory part because it could be any player with an expiring back-loaded contract that is weighing another team down, yet that player is still potentially useful - just not at that price. As for the $9 mil (give or take) in 2012; the Royals will still come into 2012 with one of the lowest payrolls in baseball, unless of course they sign Pujols to play 2B, Prince Fielder to man RF and persuade CC Sabathia to come join the rotation. So if you think you can find a better use of this money, I'm all ears.
I assume that the money won't raise much of an issue here, but a lot of baseball fans probably see the crazy Zambrano and think clubhouse problem; i.e. more Jose Guillen, less Jeff Fancouer. Maybe you can get past this, but you still see his 4.38 ERA and dropping strikeout rate as indicators of a potentially washed-up starting pitcher who won't help the team. And you know what, all of these concerns might be valid. But let's break down what Zambrano has done and just think what he could do for the Royals. Zambrano has never, save a seven inning cup-of-coffee in 2001, had an ERA over 4.00. Never, not once! The only time after he was officially moved to the starting rotation that he has not completed a season with 160+ innings and 28 starts with said sub-4.00 ERA was last year when Lou Pinella went senile for a month and made one of the best pitchers of the last decade into an 8th inning set-up man. If you're still here and have bared with me through all of this, but are not yet convinced that this is an impressive feat then let me tell you why this is so impressive to me. The entire KC Royals starting pitching rotations from the years 2000 through 2010 have been able to accomplish this (sub-4.00 ERA, 160+ innings, 28 starts) exactly SEVEN TIMES! Only three times have been by pitchers not named Zack Greinke or Gil Meche. And since Carlos Zambrano started his streak in 2003 he has been able to accomplish this seven times compared to just five for the Royals. So one starting pitcher has accomplished this feat two more times than all of the starting pitchers for the Royals COMBINED! So yes, I marvel at this achievement. Carlos has stayed healthy and been an above average starting pitcher, with flashes of greatness, for his entire career and still appears to be a useful workhorse. This is exactly the kind of pitcher the Royals need. The issues about his club house presence may or may not be of any real concern, it's hard to tell. But if you choose to believe that he is just a competitive pitcher who wants to win and is in the last year of his contract looking for another big deal then what more could you ask for?
It's a leap-of-faith, I'll grant you that, but based on the above referenced track record do you feel more comfortable penciling-in Vin Mazarro or Carlos Zambrano as you #3 starting pitcher? Do you see more potential for a #2 starter in Luke Hochevar or Zambrano? Looking at the Royals current situation, I feel that they need to start making gambles, and as far as gambles go this is one that has the potential to make a real impact on the team without sacrificing much other than a couple of secondary prospects and only a few million bucks that will hardly be felt by the payroll. Playing the waiting game with pitching prospects is fine, and Duffy has been looking better every time, but you need someone reliable in your rotation and there have been few pitchers as reliable (physically not mentally) as Carlos Zambrano. I think this is the exact situation that can be exploited by a shrewd organization; an unwanted player with a big contract and a team in need of payroll space to sign someone like Pujols or Fielder. It just reeks of desperation. If there is another, better contract dump situation out there please let me know. But this trade deadline I'd love to see Dayton take a risk instead of his past Callaspo-for-O'Sullivan snoozers that will have little impact on keeping 2012 from looking like 2011.
Trade for Carlos Zambrano
I said that you were going to have to bare with me on this one. This proposed trade has two parts: the theory and the actuality. First lets start with the theory; Carlos has an inflated contract, the Cubs desperately want rid of him, the Royals have payroll space, there is not one single middling starting pitcher worth paying for in the 2012 free agent class and by the way the Royals need a starter. Who is your projected 2012 KC Royals starting rotating? It's scary, I know. So it could be anyone, but Big Z is just the best case that I've been able to come-up with. One of the big advantages in contract absorption trades is that you won't have to give up much, so the Royals can hold on to all of their precious prospects and let go of maybe two mid-tier guys. Here is how the economics of the trade break down; Carlos is still owed something like $9 mil this year and $18 mil for 2012. Yes, these are big numbers, but the Cubs know they need to eat a good chunk of that if they want to rid themselves of Carlos and get anything in return. So I believe the best way to use the Royals deflated 2011 payroll is to eat a few mil from another team's bad contract this year, while still gaining a much needed asset. If the Royals agree to take on something like half of the contract, that means somewhere in the neighborhood of four million this year and nine next year. I'm just assuming these numbers, but if the Cubs wanted a team to pay much more than that, it would be silly. The point is; who does it hurt if the Royals payroll creeps over $40 mil this year? It's like a tree falling in the woods; the Royals planned to have around a $70 million payroll this year so it seems to me that tacking on a few mil this year will not hurt anyone. If no money is added, David Glass will simply become imperceptibly richer and maybe Christmas bonuses are little better in the executive suite. But that's it, the books will rollover to 2012, and Luke Hochevar will again be our opening day starter. I call this the theory part because it could be any player with an expiring back-loaded contract that is weighing another team down, yet that player is still potentially useful - just not at that price. As for the $9 mil (give or take) in 2012; the Royals will still come into 2012 with one of the lowest payrolls in baseball, unless of course they sign Pujols to play 2B, Prince Fielder to man RF and persuade CC Sabathia to come join the rotation. So if you think you can find a better use of this money, I'm all ears.
I assume that the money won't raise much of an issue here, but a lot of baseball fans probably see the crazy Zambrano and think clubhouse problem; i.e. more Jose Guillen, less Jeff Fancouer. Maybe you can get past this, but you still see his 4.38 ERA and dropping strikeout rate as indicators of a potentially washed-up starting pitcher who won't help the team. And you know what, all of these concerns might be valid. But let's break down what Zambrano has done and just think what he could do for the Royals. Zambrano has never, save a seven inning cup-of-coffee in 2001, had an ERA over 4.00. Never, not once! The only time after he was officially moved to the starting rotation that he has not completed a season with 160+ innings and 28 starts with said sub-4.00 ERA was last year when Lou Pinella went senile for a month and made one of the best pitchers of the last decade into an 8th inning set-up man. If you're still here and have bared with me through all of this, but are not yet convinced that this is an impressive feat then let me tell you why this is so impressive to me. The entire KC Royals starting pitching rotations from the years 2000 through 2010 have been able to accomplish this (sub-4.00 ERA, 160+ innings, 28 starts) exactly SEVEN TIMES! Only three times have been by pitchers not named Zack Greinke or Gil Meche. And since Carlos Zambrano started his streak in 2003 he has been able to accomplish this seven times compared to just five for the Royals. So one starting pitcher has accomplished this feat two more times than all of the starting pitchers for the Royals COMBINED! So yes, I marvel at this achievement. Carlos has stayed healthy and been an above average starting pitcher, with flashes of greatness, for his entire career and still appears to be a useful workhorse. This is exactly the kind of pitcher the Royals need. The issues about his club house presence may or may not be of any real concern, it's hard to tell. But if you choose to believe that he is just a competitive pitcher who wants to win and is in the last year of his contract looking for another big deal then what more could you ask for?
It's a leap-of-faith, I'll grant you that, but based on the above referenced track record do you feel more comfortable penciling-in Vin Mazarro or Carlos Zambrano as you #3 starting pitcher? Do you see more potential for a #2 starter in Luke Hochevar or Zambrano? Looking at the Royals current situation, I feel that they need to start making gambles, and as far as gambles go this is one that has the potential to make a real impact on the team without sacrificing much other than a couple of secondary prospects and only a few million bucks that will hardly be felt by the payroll. Playing the waiting game with pitching prospects is fine, and Duffy has been looking better every time, but you need someone reliable in your rotation and there have been few pitchers as reliable (physically not mentally) as Carlos Zambrano. I think this is the exact situation that can be exploited by a shrewd organization; an unwanted player with a big contract and a team in need of payroll space to sign someone like Pujols or Fielder. It just reeks of desperation. If there is another, better contract dump situation out there please let me know. But this trade deadline I'd love to see Dayton take a risk instead of his past Callaspo-for-O'Sullivan snoozers that will have little impact on keeping 2012 from looking like 2011.
Friday, June 24, 2011
Stealing vs Acquiring
Depending on your view of Frank White the announcer, we believe that it’s highly probable that Frank White the man is a heck of a guy, a swell family man and a decent guy to run into at the neighborhood BBQ. With that being said, Frank White the announcer is as bland and straightforward as an announcer can offer. We can’t recall any instance of offering even a courtesy giggle to any of Frank’s attempted “funnies”. Let’s just say that after three innings of Frank no one has ever said “Gee-Wilikers, that guy would be a hoot to go grab some beers with”.
Regardless, Frank said something the other day during the Diamondbacks game that was a somewhat original insight or one that we have not previously heard 10,000 times at a 10-year old baseball camp. Lefebre and Frank were bantering about Adam Kennedy’s slide step and how for some miraculous reason Chris Getz might not be able to steal second base (as if Chris Getz is the standard for base stealing prowess…it’s a miracle of God he got to first base to start with). The quote was something like this:
“Kennedy is able to maintain his command and keep the ball down while using that slide step. With most guys the arm doesn’t catch up and they leave the ball up when using a slide step. In my day no one knew what a slide step was, nobody used one”.
Frank played when Kauffman Stadium was large enough to fatten 300 head of cattle (if the surface was natural grass, of course). Frank also played when people really stole some bases. This was what the Powder Blue Room refers to as the Cocaine Era of Base Stealing. Just for a minute take a look at some of Vince Coleman’s stolen base numbers.
In 1985-87, Vince Coleman stole 110, 107 and 109 bases, respectively. Coleman was on 1st or 2nd base 210 times in 1985. He successfully stole a base 110 times, or about 53% of the time he was logically eligible to steal. If you count the mere 25 times Coleman was caught stealing, Coleman attempted to steal a base darn near 65% of every time he was logically eligible to do so. Keep in mind this was IN THE MAJOR LEAGUES.
That is an attempt percentage similar to your average 9-year old Little Leauge game, where this is the first year stolen bases are allowed, kid pitchers crying because they don’t know how to pitch from the stretch and the catcher can’t so much see second base much less throw it that far (wasn’t eveyone’s first “steal” sign a touch of the hat followed by a swipe against the chest….hat and belt buckle was of course bunt).
In 1986 it was more of the same. Coleman reached 1st or 2nd base 194 times. He actually stole a base 55% of the time, and tried to steal a base 63% of the time.
Vince Coleman didn’t really “steal” bases as he “acquired” them, sort of like one company “acquires” another company. According to dictionary.com the third definition of “steal” is:
“to take, get or win insidiously, surreptitiously, subtly, or by chance”
Now the Powder Blue Room has no earthly idea what the words insidiously or surreptitiously mean, but we do know there was nothing subtle about Vince Coleman’s desire to steal the next base in front of him. And the percentages show that Mr. Coleman had a successful rate of over 50%. Ask a casino if the player having a 53%-47% advantage is a game of “chance”.
"Stealing" infers some Ocean’s Eleven type scheme where Brad Pitt puts on a dandy suit, eats popcorn shrimp and somehow ends up in your vault. Vince Coleman stealing a base was true marksmanship. When standing on first base mabye Vince simply saw a mound of white stuff 90 feet away and thought he should get the good times a 'rollin (maybe have D. Strawberry and Doc Gooden out to 2nd base for a strategy session).
Of the twenty top single season stolen base totals, six occurred between 1980 and 1987. Eleven of the twenty occurred before 1900. You get the picture. This all leads to the bigger question. Why?
The Powder Blue Room has a theory and it is based on what was expected of a catcher back when. As everyone can recall, before Cal Ripken and later the A-Rod’s of the world, the average shortstop could shop for clothes in the juniors department and not hit his rear end with either hand, so long as he could field the ball.
Unfortunately, this is a theory the Kansas City Royals have adamantly adhered to for their entire existence as a franchise. There was a small change of pace with Angel Berroa for a year, but Angel never saw a pitch he didn’t deem worthy of a hack. By the end Berroa probably would have swung at a wheel pick off play to second base.
Perhaps catchers didn’t always throw 93 mph to second base. Perhaps the result of the 1980’s base stealing necessitated the requirement that catchers possess a cannon of an arm and a nano-second pop time to second. Or at least the arm strength factor did not carry as much weight in a catcher’s evaluation. A good time ago maybe a catcher was only really required to “handle his pitching staff” and block balls and not be a complete embarrassment at the plate. Nowhere in there was it required that you need to throw greyhounds out stealing.
Then teams got around to thinking “geez, if we let every fast dude that gets to first base exploit our catcher (especially with all the large multi-use stadiums back then, homeruns not being as in vogue) then why should anyone bother with a double….tell Johnson down in scouting that from now on catchers have to be able to throw the daylights out of the ball to second or else this is going to get really out of hand”.
Much like the shortstop of a pre 1990’s vintage, the required tools of a catcher might have changed. Now we have to listen to Tim McCarver say “this guy has a cannon behind the plate”. Well, Tim, now they all do. Some have more of a “cannon” of an arm than others, much like some running backs are faster than others. But they all throw aspin tablets to second base and all running backs are fast.
This has to be one of the reasons that Vince Colman could hit a single and stand on first base and have every single breathing soul in the stadium know he was going to try and steal a base, and actually do it. This is not the same bowl of soup as when Jose Canseco was the first to hit 40 home runs and steal 40 bases in a season. Almost any major leaguer can scrounge up 40 trash stolen bases by guessing right and strategically attempting stolen bases in the 7th inning of a blowout, August 23rd, Sunday 1pm, Oakland-Kansas City getaway game in Kauffman Stadium, when it is 400 degrees Kelvin outside, the catcher is nursing last night’s P&L escapade and fielders would rather not run over to second to field the throw.
Mickey Mantle summed it up best when after Canseco accomplished the 40-40 feat he was asked why he was never able to pull it off. The Mick’s answer:
“Hell if I’d known 40-40 was going to be a big deal I would have done it every year”.
We don’t have any real evidence of the above theory and obviously there are a ton of other reasons for prolific 1980’s base thievery. Perhaps pitchers just came to reason that if fast guys that have a knack for stealing bases really want second base, then bless their souls let them have it. At some point it becomes counterproductive to delay the inevitable.
Or as Frank White said, maybe it took a little while to develop the counter offense technique of a slide step. Baseball people will tell you “you steal a base on the pitcher and blah blah blah”. That’s true when you are trying to “steal” a base, where pitch count, pitch selection and so on matter most. When you are trying to “acquire” a base, and everyone knows it, the catcher’s arm strength really matters. It’s the arm strength that is going to make up the difference in the runners speed and jump during a base “acquisition”. That extra arm strength is going to give you a shot. That little difference is what you need to get Vince Coleman when the pitcher is slide stepping, has thrown over 2,000 times, and the previous four pitch-out attempts went by without cause.
Our guess is that the 1980’s thievery of bases caused the new modern day catcher that can really, really throw to second base. Vince Coleman might have been like a gambler or investor that finds an edge before the crowd catches on. Boy did he ride the wave.
Regardless, Frank said something the other day during the Diamondbacks game that was a somewhat original insight or one that we have not previously heard 10,000 times at a 10-year old baseball camp. Lefebre and Frank were bantering about Adam Kennedy’s slide step and how for some miraculous reason Chris Getz might not be able to steal second base (as if Chris Getz is the standard for base stealing prowess…it’s a miracle of God he got to first base to start with). The quote was something like this:
“Kennedy is able to maintain his command and keep the ball down while using that slide step. With most guys the arm doesn’t catch up and they leave the ball up when using a slide step. In my day no one knew what a slide step was, nobody used one”.
Frank played when Kauffman Stadium was large enough to fatten 300 head of cattle (if the surface was natural grass, of course). Frank also played when people really stole some bases. This was what the Powder Blue Room refers to as the Cocaine Era of Base Stealing. Just for a minute take a look at some of Vince Coleman’s stolen base numbers.
In 1985-87, Vince Coleman stole 110, 107 and 109 bases, respectively. Coleman was on 1st or 2nd base 210 times in 1985. He successfully stole a base 110 times, or about 53% of the time he was logically eligible to steal. If you count the mere 25 times Coleman was caught stealing, Coleman attempted to steal a base darn near 65% of every time he was logically eligible to do so. Keep in mind this was IN THE MAJOR LEAGUES.
That is an attempt percentage similar to your average 9-year old Little Leauge game, where this is the first year stolen bases are allowed, kid pitchers crying because they don’t know how to pitch from the stretch and the catcher can’t so much see second base much less throw it that far (wasn’t eveyone’s first “steal” sign a touch of the hat followed by a swipe against the chest….hat and belt buckle was of course bunt).
In 1986 it was more of the same. Coleman reached 1st or 2nd base 194 times. He actually stole a base 55% of the time, and tried to steal a base 63% of the time.
Vince Coleman didn’t really “steal” bases as he “acquired” them, sort of like one company “acquires” another company. According to dictionary.com the third definition of “steal” is:
“to take, get or win insidiously, surreptitiously, subtly, or by chance”
Now the Powder Blue Room has no earthly idea what the words insidiously or surreptitiously mean, but we do know there was nothing subtle about Vince Coleman’s desire to steal the next base in front of him. And the percentages show that Mr. Coleman had a successful rate of over 50%. Ask a casino if the player having a 53%-47% advantage is a game of “chance”.
"Stealing" infers some Ocean’s Eleven type scheme where Brad Pitt puts on a dandy suit, eats popcorn shrimp and somehow ends up in your vault. Vince Coleman stealing a base was true marksmanship. When standing on first base mabye Vince simply saw a mound of white stuff 90 feet away and thought he should get the good times a 'rollin (maybe have D. Strawberry and Doc Gooden out to 2nd base for a strategy session).
Of the twenty top single season stolen base totals, six occurred between 1980 and 1987. Eleven of the twenty occurred before 1900. You get the picture. This all leads to the bigger question. Why?
The Powder Blue Room has a theory and it is based on what was expected of a catcher back when. As everyone can recall, before Cal Ripken and later the A-Rod’s of the world, the average shortstop could shop for clothes in the juniors department and not hit his rear end with either hand, so long as he could field the ball.
Unfortunately, this is a theory the Kansas City Royals have adamantly adhered to for their entire existence as a franchise. There was a small change of pace with Angel Berroa for a year, but Angel never saw a pitch he didn’t deem worthy of a hack. By the end Berroa probably would have swung at a wheel pick off play to second base.
Perhaps catchers didn’t always throw 93 mph to second base. Perhaps the result of the 1980’s base stealing necessitated the requirement that catchers possess a cannon of an arm and a nano-second pop time to second. Or at least the arm strength factor did not carry as much weight in a catcher’s evaluation. A good time ago maybe a catcher was only really required to “handle his pitching staff” and block balls and not be a complete embarrassment at the plate. Nowhere in there was it required that you need to throw greyhounds out stealing.
Then teams got around to thinking “geez, if we let every fast dude that gets to first base exploit our catcher (especially with all the large multi-use stadiums back then, homeruns not being as in vogue) then why should anyone bother with a double….tell Johnson down in scouting that from now on catchers have to be able to throw the daylights out of the ball to second or else this is going to get really out of hand”.
Much like the shortstop of a pre 1990’s vintage, the required tools of a catcher might have changed. Now we have to listen to Tim McCarver say “this guy has a cannon behind the plate”. Well, Tim, now they all do. Some have more of a “cannon” of an arm than others, much like some running backs are faster than others. But they all throw aspin tablets to second base and all running backs are fast.
This has to be one of the reasons that Vince Colman could hit a single and stand on first base and have every single breathing soul in the stadium know he was going to try and steal a base, and actually do it. This is not the same bowl of soup as when Jose Canseco was the first to hit 40 home runs and steal 40 bases in a season. Almost any major leaguer can scrounge up 40 trash stolen bases by guessing right and strategically attempting stolen bases in the 7th inning of a blowout, August 23rd, Sunday 1pm, Oakland-Kansas City getaway game in Kauffman Stadium, when it is 400 degrees Kelvin outside, the catcher is nursing last night’s P&L escapade and fielders would rather not run over to second to field the throw.
Mickey Mantle summed it up best when after Canseco accomplished the 40-40 feat he was asked why he was never able to pull it off. The Mick’s answer:
“Hell if I’d known 40-40 was going to be a big deal I would have done it every year”.
We don’t have any real evidence of the above theory and obviously there are a ton of other reasons for prolific 1980’s base thievery. Perhaps pitchers just came to reason that if fast guys that have a knack for stealing bases really want second base, then bless their souls let them have it. At some point it becomes counterproductive to delay the inevitable.
Or as Frank White said, maybe it took a little while to develop the counter offense technique of a slide step. Baseball people will tell you “you steal a base on the pitcher and blah blah blah”. That’s true when you are trying to “steal” a base, where pitch count, pitch selection and so on matter most. When you are trying to “acquire” a base, and everyone knows it, the catcher’s arm strength really matters. It’s the arm strength that is going to make up the difference in the runners speed and jump during a base “acquisition”. That extra arm strength is going to give you a shot. That little difference is what you need to get Vince Coleman when the pitcher is slide stepping, has thrown over 2,000 times, and the previous four pitch-out attempts went by without cause.
Our guess is that the 1980’s thievery of bases caused the new modern day catcher that can really, really throw to second base. Vince Coleman might have been like a gambler or investor that finds an edge before the crowd catches on. Boy did he ride the wave.
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